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Pervasive Judicial Doctrines in the





During the nineteenth century, the practice of construing taxing
statutes strictly against the government was said to be "founded so
firmly upon principles of equity and natural justice as not to admit
reasonable doubt."l As explained by Mr. Justice Story in 1842:
In every case . . . of doubt, [taxing] statutes are construed
most strongly against the government, and in favor of the subjects
or citizens, because burdens are not to be imposed, nor presumed
to be imposed, beyond what the statutes expressly and clearly im-
port. Revenue statutes are in no just sense either remedial laws or
laws founded upon any permanent public policy, and therefore
are not to be liberally construed.2
This approach, which bracketed taxing statutes with laws imposing
criminal penalties or forfeitures, was not without challenge even in
its heyday,3 and by now has been largely abandoned.
• <I:> 1978, by Boris I. Bittker.
.. B.A., Cornell University, 1938; LL.B., Yale University, 1941; Sterling Professor of
Law Yale University.
I. Cahoon v. Coe, 57 N.H. 556, 570 (1876).
2. United States v. Wigglesworth, 28 F. Cas. 595, 597 (Mass. 1842).
3. For an extended nineteenth century discussion of this subject, see COOLEY, A TREA-
TISE ON THE LAW OF TAXATION (2d ed. 1886),265-275, who favored (at 272) a middle road:
Construction is not to assume either that the taxpayer, who raises the legal ques-
tion of his liability under the laws, is necessarily seeking to avoid a duty to the state
which protects him, nor, on the other hand, that the government, in demanding its
dues, is a tyrant, which, while too powerful to be resisted, may justifiably be ob-
structed and defeated by any subtle device or ingenious sophism whatsoever....
All construction. . . which assumes either the one or the other, is likely to be mis-
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Contemporary courts apply tax laws with greater tolerance
-some would say enthusiasm-and if strict construction is still a
watchword, it is more likely to be used against the taxpayer in cases
deciding the scope of statutory exceptions, deductions, and similar
allowances than against the government.4 Often, however, what one
taxpayer loses from the strict construction of a statutory provision,
another taxpayer gai.qs. Thus, if the term "capital asset" is narrowly
dermed to deny the benefit of the lower tax rate for capital gains to a
taxpayer who sells his property at a profit, the same narrow con-
struction will inure to the benefit of other taxpayers who have in-
curred losses on the sale of similar property, since they will not be
subjected to the special limitations on the deductibility of capital
losses.
Quite aside from the possibility that a court's effort to help out
the Treasury in a close case may give the government a pyrrhic vic-
tory, however, it is far from clear why the Internal Revenue Code
should be construed strictly against either the taxpayer or the gov-
ernment.5 A more salutary attitude was advocated by Mr. Justice
Holmes, responding to the once-popular adage that statutes in dero-
gation of the common law should be strictly construed:
The Legislature has the power to decide what the policy of
the law shall be, and if it has intimated its will, however, indi-
rectly, that will should be recognized and obeyed. The major
premise of the conclusion expressed in a statute, the change of
chievous, and to take one-sided views, not only of the laws, but of personal and
official conduct.
The trend away from strict construction has been strengthened by frequent inclusion in
state laws of a directive to interpret the law with a view to accomplishing its objectives. 2A
SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (4th ed. 1973), Sec. 58.03, n.14.
4. See, e.g., Com Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955) (strict con-
struction of term "capital assets" in order to reduce "preferential treatment" for capital gains);
Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590 (1943) (income tax deductions are a
"matter of legislative grace and . . . the burden of clearly showing the right to the claimed
deduction is on the taxpayer").
See generally Griswold, An Argument Against the Doctrine that Deductions Should he Nar-
rowly Construed as a Maller ofLegislative Grace, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1142 (1943).
Despite the popularity of the theory that many tax allowances are the equivalent ofsubsi-
dies and constitute a program of "welfare for the rich" (see Bittker, Income Tax "Loopholes"
and Political Rhetoric, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1099 (1973», it has evidently not been suggested that
these provisions should be liberally construed in favor of the taxpayer, in the spirit of Cox v.
Roth, 348 U.S. 207 (1955) (welfare legislation is to be liberally construed in favor of its in-
tended beneficiaries).
5. Ofcourse, the taxpayer has the burden of proof in litigated cases as respects factual
issues; the discussion in the text is concerned with the resolution of legal questions.
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policy that induces the enactment, may not be set out in terms, but
it is not an adequate discharge of duty for courts to say: We see
what you are driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore we
shall go on as before.6
In applying the Internal Revenue Code to particular trans-
actions, the courts frequently distinguish between "tax avoidance"
and ''tax evasion" and between "form" and "substance," assert that
transactions are to be taken at face value for tax purposes only if
they are imbued with a "business purpose" or reflect "economic real-
ity," and integrate all steps in a prearranged plan rather than give
effect to each step as though it were a separate transaction. These
presuppositions or criteria are so pervasive that, in combination,
they resemble a preamble to the Code, describing the framework
within which all statutory provisions are to function. Like the canons
of statutory construction, however, these judicial presuppositions are
more successful in establishing an attitude or mood than in supply-
ing crisp answers to specific questions.7 In decisions dealing with
particular practical problems, however, these pervasive judicial doc-
trines are extremely important despite their vagueness. Indeed, in
some areas they are influential primarily because they are vague;
when the meaning of a tax provision is veiled by fog, taxpayers usu-
ally tread more warily than when the landmarks are clearly visible.
As Mr. Justice Brandeis observed in a similar context:
If you are walking along a precipice no human being can tell you
how near you can go to that precipice without falling over, be-
cause you may stumble on a loose stone, you may slip, and go
over; but anybody can tell you where you can walk perfectly
safely within convenient distance of that precipice.8
6. Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908) (Mr. Justice Holmes on circuit).
For a similar comment by Mr. Justice Stone in a tax case, see White v. United States, 305 U.S.
281, 292 (1938) (duty of courts, in tax cases as in other litigation, is to decide "what [the)
construction fairly should be"), quoted with approval by Griswold, supra note 4, at 1144-45;
see also Cooley's earlier support for the same principle of even-handedness, supra note 3.
7. Thus, Paul's monumental effort to provide a "restatement of the law" of tax avoid-
ance, infra note II, contains few generalizations and demonstrates that the subject is "exqui-
sitely unCertain," as Judge Jerome Frank points out in his introduction (at p. 2) to the Paul
essay. See generally, Rice, Judicial Techniques in Combating Tax Avoidance, 51 MICH. L. REV.
1021 (1953).
See also the Australian and Canadian statutory catch-all prohibitions on tax avoidance
transactions, described by Blum, Motive, Intent and Purpose in Federal Income Taxation, 34 U.
CHI. L. REV. 485, 524-25, n.107 (1967).
8. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 352 (1946).
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Mr. Justice Holmes did not object to the in terrorem effect of uncer-
tainty even in criminal law:
Whenever the law draws a line there will be cases very near each
other on opposite sides. The precise course of the line may be un-
certain, but no one can come near it without knowing that he does
so, if he thinks, and if he does so it is familiar to the criminal law
to make him take the risk.9
In point of fact, the layman is far more inclined than the expert
to trust paperwork as a shield against tax liability. Tax lawyers are
bombarded at cocktail parties with tax schemes, offered as proof
positive of the speaker's astute sophistication, that would not con-
vince the most inexperienced revenue agent or that teeter on the
brink of fraud. Randolph Paul's comments on this subject cannot be
improved:
Above all things, a tax attorney must be an indefatigable skeptic;
he must discount everything he hears and reads. The market place
abounds with unsound avoidance schemes which will not stand
the test of objective analysis and litigation. The escaped tax, a fa-
vorite topic of conversation at the best clubs and the most sum-
tuous pleasure resorts, expands with repetition into fantastic
legends. But clients want opinions with happy endings, and he
smiles best who smiles last. It is wiser to state misgivings at the
beginning than to have to acknowledge them ungracefully at the
end. The tax adviser has, therefore, to spend a large part of his
time advising against schemes of this character. I sometimes think
that the most important word in his vocabulary is "No" . 10
B. Tax Avoidance vs. Tax Evasion
Although the terms are occasionally used interchangeably, II it is
more common to contrast "tax avoidance" with "tax evasion," the
former phrase denoting lawful modes of minimizing or avoiding tax
liability, while the latter implies fraudulent behavior. The line be-
9. United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 399 (1930). Although judicial tolerance to-
ward vagueness in criminal statutes has dwindled, United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612 (1954),
the in terrorem effect of vagueness on would-be tax dodgers is >usually approved by the com-
mentators. See Blum, A Pronouncement on Tax Avoidance, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 135, 138.
10. Paul, The Lawyer as a Tax Adviser, 25 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 412, 416 (1953).
II. See Paul, Restatement ofthe Law ofTax Avoidance, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXAnON
(1937) 9, at 12 et seq.; Justice Holmes' observation, infra note 14; § 482, which uses the term
"evasion" but is applicable to a broad spectrum of "tax avoidance" transactions having no
fraudulent overtones whatsoever.
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tween lawful conduct (which, of course, mayor may not achieve its
tax reduction objective) and fraudulent or criminal misconduct is ex-
amined at length in specialized works; 12 for present purposes, the
term "tax evasion" can be reserved for conduct that entails decep-
tion, concealment, destruction of records, and the like, while "tax
avoidance" refers to behavior that the taxpayer hopes will serve to
reduce his tax liability but that he is prepared to disclose fully to the
Internal Revenue Service.
Used in this sense, "tax avoidance" embraces a virtually unlim-
ited spectrum of personal, financial, and business transactions. Tax-
payers often organize corporations, establish trusts, make gifts, sell
property, and borrow money-to mention only a few obvious ar-
eas-in ways or at times calculated to reduce their tax liabilities. In
many cases, the tax saving is so clearly granted by the statute that
even the most severe moralist would direct any criticism at Congress
rather than at the taxpayer. Thus, when the Internal Revenue Code
requires one of several options to be chosen (e.g., cash or accrual
accounting; straight line or accelerated depreciation; etc.), it would
be quixotic to gladden the heart of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue by picking the most costly. Citizens who want to make a
voluntary contribution to the Treasury can do so by sending in their
checks at any time; there is no reason to use the tax return as a vehi-
cle for such generosity. A fortiori, it is hard to fault a taxpayer who
engages in a transaction with significant nontax results (e.g., operat-
ing a business as a proprietorship rather than in corporate form, or
selling property rather than continuing to hold it), even though his
decision is motivated more by the tax saving to be achieved than by
the transaction's other consequences. Even Mr. Justice Holmes, who
allegedly said that "I like to pay taxes; with them I buy civilization,"
did not give his money to the Treasury until his death. 13
In any event, the issue for consideration here is not whether tax-
payers who seek to minimize their taxes by engaging in transactions
of the types just described should be condemned as tight-fisted, but
whether the courts-staffed not by moral philosophers, but by ju-
rists-will uphold their legal claims. An affirmative answer is so self-
12. See, for example, BALTER, TAX FRAUD AND EVASION (4th ed., 1976), Chapter 2.
13. The original location of this widely-quoted remark has eluded me. In Compania
General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927), Holmes, dissenting,
said, "Taxes are what we pay for civilized society. . . ."
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evident that the transactions themselves would not be challenged by
the Internal Revenue Service, except in quite special circumstances.
The Code bristles with elections, options, and statutory incen-
tives, and it is perfectly clear that Congress expects, and often hopes,
that they will be used. It may, indeed, be confusing to apply the tax
avoidance label to behavior so clearly sanctioned by Congress as the
use of these statutory opportunities. In common parlance, that term
often conjures up a transaction whose success depends on a debata-
ble interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision, or on an in-
advertant loophole in the law that will probably be closed if and
when it comes to public attention. Used in this sense, "tax avoid-
ance" implies risk; and this in tum raises the question: If the tax-
payer is trying to take advantage of an ambiguous provision, should
it be construed against him in order to discourage tax avoidance, at
least if that was his sole or principal motive?
It is clear that the courts do not regard themselves as invested
with a roving commission to extirpate tax avoidance. There are three
classic statements justifying judicial disregard of the taxpayer's mo-
tive if, though close to the dividing line, he has stayed on the taxable
side--all quoted so frequently that experienced tax lawyers know
them by heart. One is a 1930 observation by Mr. Justice Holmes:
The only purpose of the [taxpayer] was to escape taxation. . . .
The fact that it desired to evade the law, as it is called, is immate-
rial, because the very meaning of a line in the law is that you may
intentionally go as close to it as you can if you do not pass it. 14
The second statement is by Judge Learned Hand:
We agree with the [Board of Tax Appeals, the predecessor of
the United States Tax Court] and the taxpayer that a transaction,
otherwise within an exception of the tax law, does not lose its im-
munity, because it is actuated by a desire to avoid, or, of one
choose, to evade, taxation. Anyone may so arrange his affairs that
14. Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 u.s. 390, 395-396 (1930). See also Mr. Justice
Holmes' earlier statement to the same effect in Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625, 630-631
(1916):
We do not speak of evasion, because, when the law draws a line, a case is on one side
of it or the other, and if on the safe side is none the worse legally that a party has
availed himself to the full of what the law permits. When an act is condemned as an
evasion what is meant is that it is on the wrong side of the line indicated by the policy
if not by the mere letter of the law.
The term "evade" is used by Mr. Justice Holmes in both cases to denote an unsuccessful
attempt to avoid taxation, not as synonymous with fraud. See supra note II.
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his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that
pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patri-
otic duty to increase one's taxes. 15
The third, described as "the most eloquent short defense ever to ap-
pear of the state of being tax-conscious and, by implication, of the
art of tax planning,"16 is also by Judge Learned Hand:
Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister
in so arranging one's affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible.
Everybody does so, rich or poor; and all do right, for nobody owes
any public duty to pay more than the law demands: taxes are en-
forced exactions, not voluntary contributions. To demand more in
the name of morals is mere cant. 17
The statements that tax avoidance is practiced by rich and poor
alike must be taken as exaggeration, since wage-earners have few
opportunities to "arrange [their] affairs" so as to reduce their taxes
and it is not clear why Judge Hand felt impelled to commend persons
engaged in tax avoidance for "doing right," rather than merely up-
holding their privilege to do so. These reservations aside, his central
message-''the doctrine that a man's motive to avoid taxation will
not establish his liability if the transaction does not do so without
it"18-is widely accepted.
Judicial reluctance to decide tax cases on the basis of the tax-
payer's state of mind is understandable. Given high rates and the
divergent tax burdens imposed on alternative ways of accomplishing
similar nontax results, "tax planning" is as American as apple pie. If
as a general rule of tax administration, doubts were routinely re-
solved against persons harboring a motive, purpose or intent l9 to re-
duce their tax liability, scrupulous taxpayers would pay a heavy
price for candor in responding to the Internal Revenue Service's
questions about their state of mind. At the same time, disingenuous
taxpayers and persuasive liars would go scot-free, unless revenue
15. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aJTd, Gregory v. Helvering,
293 U.S. 465 (1935).
16. Chrieistein, Learned Hand's Contribution to the Law q/Tax Avoidance, 77 YALE L.J.
440,456 (1968).
17. Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-851 (2d Cir. 1947) (dissent), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 859 (1947).
18. Chisholm v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 641
(1936).
19. For distinctions among these terms, see Blum, supra note 7; Paul, Motive andIntent in
Federal Tax Law, SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION (2d series 1938) 255, at 271-304.
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agents, judges, and juries came to reject disavowals of any tax avoid-
ance intent as too bizarre to be believed. In that event, however, tax-
payers who were in fact too ignorant, naive, or open-handed to
inquire into the tax effect of their transactions would be penalized
along with the others. An intermediate approach, under which a
tainted purpose would not automatically count against the taxpayer
but would be fatal if it met a specified standard (e.g., "principal,"
"major factor," "proximate cause," etc.), would be at least as diffi-
cult to apply in practice as a blanket rule, and would probably to be
as erratic in its results was the concept of "contemplation of death"
in estate taxation until its repeal in 1976.20
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the flavor of a
stew is never impaired by a generous infusion of tax avoidance. Af-
ter asserting that the taxpayer's purpose was a neutral circumstance,
both Holmes and Hand in the first two opinions quoted above went
on to resolve the tax question in favor of the government, and it is
hard to escape the conclusion that the aroma of tax avoidance con-
tributed to the outcome?1 Even if the taxpayer's purpose was wholly
irrelevant in these cases, however, there are other circumstances in
which it cannot be disregarded.
First, the Code contains many statutory provisions that explic-
itly make tax avoidance an operative factor in determining tax liabil-
ity. Thus, § 532 imposes a special tax on "every corporation . . .
formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding the income tax with
respect to its shareholders"; § 357(b)(l), involving the treatment of
an assumption of debt in certain transfers to a controlled corpora-
tion, requires a determination of whether "the principal purpose of
the taxpayer ... was a purpose to avoid Federal income tax"; and
§ 306(b)(4) exempts certain sales and redemptions from unfavorable
20. See BIITKER & STONE, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION (4th ed.,
1972), 1111-1128, and 1977 Supplement.
21. In the Superior Oil Co., the court said thai a crucial document (relied on by the tax-
payer to establish that a transaction was in interstate commerce and immune to a state sales
tax) "seems to have had no other use than ... to try to convert a domestic transaction into one
of interstate commerce"; in Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), the taxpayer created a transi-
tory corporation that was promptly, and pursuant to plan, liquidated. On the significance of
tax avoidance in Gregory, see Chirelstein, supra note 16, concluding (at 464) that Judge Hand
favored "an interpretative rule of general application ... that ambiguous transactions were to
be characterized in the Commissioner's favor, unless the taxpayer could dispel the ambiguity
by showing that the form which he had chosen carried with it, or was expected to carry with it,
some appreciable economic effect beyond tax savings."
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tax treatment "[i]f it is established to the satisfaction of the Internal
Revenue Service that the transaction was not in pursuance of a plan
having as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of Federal in-
come tax."22 The difficulty of administering a statutory distinction
between transactions that are, and those that are not, dominated by
tax avoidance objectives has more than once led' Congress to impose
a disability on all transactions in the suspect category, whether guilty
or not. 23
Second, in deciding whether to accept the form in which a trans-
action was cast by the taxpayer or to probe beneath the surface in
search of its substance or net effect, revenue agents and courts some-
times respond to the aroma of tax avoidance like hounds to the scent
of foxes. They are likely to suspect that the form adopted by the
taxpayer is a self-serving declaration-"motive is a persuasive inter-
preter of equivocal conduct"24-if the Internal Revenue Code seems
to be more influential in shaping a transaction than its nontax re-
sults. Used as a divining rod, however, the taxpayer's tax avoidance
purpose serves only the preliminary purpose of advising the Internal
Revenue Service and courts where to dig; it does not help in deciding
whether what is actually found falls on the taxable or the nontaxable
side of the statutory line. Conversely, even if a transaction serves no
tax avoidance purpose, it may deserve closer inspection; appearances
do not always correspond to reality. But the percentage of false
scents will probably be greater among these "innocent" transactions
than among those characterized by tax avoidance objectives. In the
words of Randolph Paul:
In deciding a fact issue the courts will analyze and scrutinize
with special zeal where tax avoidance appears as a motive. But
that motive will be immaterial except as an eye-opening mecha-
nism or interpreter of equivocal conduct; it will not negative the
effect of a transaction which has really occurred.25
22, For other instances and general discussion, see Cohen, Tax Avoidonce Purpose as a
Statutory Text in Tax Legis/ation, 9 TULANE TAX INST, 229 (1960); Fischer, Intent and Taxes,
32 TAXES 303 (1954); Blum, How the Courts, Congress and the IRS Try to Limit Lega/ Tax
Avoidonce, 10 J. TAX. 300 (1959).
23. E.g., § 267(a)(I), denying any deduction for losses on sales between related taxpayers,
whether at a fair market price or not; and § 166(d)(I), providing that nonbusiness bad debts
create capital rather than ordinary losses.
24. Texas & N.O.R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 559 (1930).
25. Paul, supra note II, at 152. See a/so Morsman v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 18,22 (8th
Cir. 1937), cerl. denied, 302 U.S. 701 (1937):
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A decision to probe beneath the surface may result from evi-
dence that the taxpayer before the court was in fact actuated by a tax
avoidance purpose, but such a purpose may be inferred as frequently
from the nature of the transaction as from the nature of the taxpayer.
Whatever his state of mind, if he travels into a territory that is much
frequented by tax-conscious citizens, revenue agents and courts are
likely to subject his papers to searching scrutiny.
Finally, when construing ambiguous statutory language, the
courts often reject interpretations that would foster tax avoidance
before sanctifying legal forms that do not affect the substance of the
transaction. Since the statute as construed will affect all taxpayers,
however, the state of mind of the litigant who happens to come
before the court (however significant it may be in determining
whether the forms he has used correspond to the substance of his
transaction) is less important in such cases than the objectives oftax-
payers as a group. If the court concludes that they are likely to en-
gage in the particular transaction primarily to reduce taxes rather
than to achieve nontax business or personal objectives, the statutory
provision will often be construed strictly in favor of the government,
and this meaning will be visited upon all taxpayers, even those whol-
ly devoid of a tax avoidance purpose.26 Thus, the following com-
ments in Helvering v; CIi/ford,27 taxing to the husband-grantor the
income of a short-term trust established for the benefit of his wife,·
When a taxpayer . . . boldly proclaims that his intent, at least in part, in at·
tempting to create a trust is to evade taxes, the courts should examine the forms used
by him for the accomplishment of his purpose with particular care; and, if his ingenu-
ity fails at any point, the court shoulo not lend him its aid by resolving doubts m his
favor.
Though referring explicitly to a taxpayer whose tax avoidance intent was "boldly proclaimed,"
the court presumably would have employed the same approach if his intent was reluctantly
disclosed by the taxpayer or inferred by the court.
26. Concluding his exhaustive examination of the "law" of tax avoidance, Randolph
Paul offered only two general rules--the one quoted in the text (supra note 25) and the
following:
In interpreting a tax statute the courts will, in their natural and perhaps imposed
duty to protect the revenue, adopt an attitude of skepticism as to the meaning urged
by a tax-avoiding taxpayer. . . and will on occasion decide that a statutory provislon
is not meant to protect the taxpayer who seeks to avoid the burden which would be
his but for the provision in question. [Supra note II, at 153.)
As suggested in the text, however, in interpreting statutory language, courts are more likely to
be influenced by the prevalence of tax avoidance purposes among taxpayers generally than by
the motive of the taxpayer before the court, whose state of mind may be idiosyncratic. See the
Holmes and Hand views about the irrelevance of the individual taxpayer's motive, described
supra note 14 and 16.
27. 309 U.S. 331, 334-336 (1940).
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refer to the state of mind of the "average" taxpayer, and would not
have to be revised on a showing that the litigant's outlook on life was
different:
The broad sweep of [the statutory predecessor of § 61(a)] in-
dicates the purpose of Congress to use the full measure of its tax-
ing power within those defmable categories. . . . Hence our
construction of the statute should be consonant with that purpose.
Technical considerations, niceties of the law of trusts or convey-
ances, or the legal paraphernalia which inventive genius may con-
struct as a refuge from surtaxes should not obscure the basic issue.
That issue is whether the grantor after the trust has been estab-
lished may still be treated, under this statutory scheme, as the
owner of the corpus. . . .
We have at best a temporary reallocation of income within an
intimate family group. Since the income remains in the family and
since the husband retains control over the investment, he has
rather complete assurance that the trust will not effect any sub-
stantial change in his economic position. It is hard to imagine that
respondent felt himself the poorer after this trust had been exe-
cuted or, if he did, that it had any rational foundation in fact.28
C Form ys. Substance
When today's federal income tax was still in its swaddling
clothes, the Supreme Court treated the superiority of substance over
form as a well-settled principle in tax matters, saying (in 1921):
We recognize the importance of regarding matters of sub-
stance and disregarding forms in applying the provisions of the
Sixteenth Amendment and income tax laws enacted thereunder.
In a number of cases. . . we have under varying conditions fol-
lowed the rule.29
Almost half a century ago, "form" and "substance" were described
as "the most overworked words in the tax vocabulary";30 the same
28. Id.
29. United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 168 (1921). See also Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S.
242, 254 (1924):
Questions of taxation must be determined by viewing what was actually done, rather
than the declared purpose of the participants; and when applying the provisions of
the Sixteenth Amendment and income [tax) laws enacted thereunder we must regard
matters of substance and not mere form.
30. Underwood, Form and Substance in Tax Cases, 16 VA. L. REV. 327, 341 (1930). The
HeinOnline -- 21 Howard L.J. 704 1978
704 HOWAR/J LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21
verdict would probably be reached today if there were a new trial on
more recent evidence.
Despite all this, there are times when form-and form alone
-determines the tax consequences of a transaction. The numerous
accounting elections that are authorized by the Code, for example,
drastically affect tax liabilities, but rarely alter the taxpayer's rela-
tions with the outside world.3l Yet it is perfectly clear that the tax-
payer's right to report income on the cash rather than the accrual
method, to elect accelerated rather than straight-line depreciation, to
use a fiscal or calendar year, and to exercise similar accounting op-
tions is not in any way impaired by the fact that these are matters of
form rather than substance. Similarly, a taxpayer with several blocks
of stock of the same company, purchased over a period of time at
different prices, can sell either high cost or low cost shares merely by
delivering one certificate rather than another or even, when a partic-
ular lot of shares cannot be traced into a separate certificate, by
designating which shares he proposes to sell?2 Whichever form is
employed to separate the shares sold from those retained, it will have
no nontax ramifications. There are also a few statutory provisions
that, the courts have held, deliberately elevate form above substance.
An example is IRC § 71(b), providing that a payment under a decree
of divorce or separate maintenance is not taxable to the wife if
the decree fixes it "as a sum which is payable for the support of
minor children of the husband," a condition that requires "specific
earmarking" and cannot be satisfied by evidence that in substance,
though not in form, the payment was made for the support of the
author went on (at 341-342) to lament (with, needless to say, no success) judicial searches for
the substance behind a transaction's form:
But in cases involving merely the interpretation of tax laws, would it not have been
better to place the emphasis on form? Form is deftnite and cenain; all possible acts of
persons have been clilssifted and dermed through the hundreds of years of judicial
transaction known to trade and commerce has Its precise label or tag. . . . What a
nightmare "substance" must have been during all these years to that harassed and
overworked individual, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue!
See also Ballantine, The Courts and Tax Administration: A Plea for a Return to the Statutory
Language, 35 A.B.A.J. 369 (1949).
31. Provisions like § 472(c), permitting LIFO accounting for inventories to be used for
tax purposes only if the same method is used by the taxpayer in reponing to investors and
lenders, are exceptions to this general principle. See Blum, The Importance of Form in the
Taxation of Corporate Transactions, 54 TAXES 613 (1976); Kingston, The /Jeep Structure of
Taxation: /Jividend /Jistribution, 85 YALE L.J. 861, 863 et. seq. (1976).
32. See, for example, Rev. Rul. 56-653, 1956-2 CB 185.
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children.33
Despite these examples of the occasional pre-eminence of form,
in deciding federal tax cases the courts are ordinarily willing if not
eager to take account of the substance behind the veil of form.34
Randolph Paul once said that "lawyers who do not know that form
sometimes controls, should not be practicing law."35 With equal
force, it can be said that those who do not know that form is often
disregarded should also be barred from practice. The appeal from
form to substance is often deplored as more confusing than helpful,
and the words themselves have been catigated by Judge Learned
Hand as ''vague alternatives ... anodynes for the pains of reason-
ing,"36 but it is hard to imagine how a mature jurisprudence could
consistently adhere to formalities in all circumstances. To reach no
further back than the Europe of the Middle Ages and Renaissance,
for an example, the Catholic Church's prohibition of usury set into
motion a never-ceasing inquiry into the form of transactions de-
signed to evade the restriction, including sales of property with an
option in the seller to repurchase for a higher price at a later date-a
device that is still sometimes used in the hope of avoiding the tax
results of a mortgage.37
Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to distill useful general-
izations from the welter of substance-over-form cases. First, the facts
of particular cases are usually complicated, and it is not clear which
facts are crucial to the decision and which are irrelevant; this uncer-
tainty about the precedential value of the decision is often com-
pounded by the court's failure to say whether its conclusion rests on
a fmding of fact that might have gone the other way if a witness had
33. Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1960). Although this case involved a correla-
tive deduction by the husband under the statutory predecessor of § 215, the Court's insistence
on form clearly applies equally to § 71, with the result that both the husband (in claiming a
deduction) and the Internal Revenue Service (in seeking to tax the payments to the wife) are
bound by the form rather than substance of the agreement or decree. See also IRC § 152(e)(2)
(agrement between divorced parents regarding the dependency exemption for their children),
and Foxman v. Commissioner, 41 TC 535, 551 (1964) (partnership provisions permitting "the
partners themselves to determine their tax burdens inter se to a certain extent").
34. Tax cases, of course, are not unique in searching for substance; a common analogue
is the piercing of the corporate veil in private lawsuits. See BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS
(rev. ed. 1946), Sec. 122; see also Paul, supra note ll, at 66-73.
35. Paul, supra note II, at 89, n.304.
36. Commissioner v. Sansome, 60 F.2d 931, 933 (2d Cir. 1932), cerl. denied, 287 U.S. 667
(1932).
37. NOONAN, THE SCHOLASTIC ANALYSIS OF USURY 95-98 (1957).
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been more credible, or was required as a matter of law. In a leading
case, for example, the Supreme Court held that a transaction (the
purchase of ten 3D-year deferred annuity savings bonds, fmanced by
a down payment and funds borrowed from the issuer against their
cash surrender value) was "a sham," devoid of appreciable economic
results, because "there was nothing of substance to be realized [by
the taxpayer] beyond a tax deduction."38
The factual basis for this conclusion was that the taxpayer was
paying interest to the issuer of the bonds at the rate of 3-1/2% on its
fmancing loan to him, while the investment was growing in value by
only 2-1/2% annually; the net annual cash loss of one percent of the
borrowed funds was incurred only to achieve a tax deduction for the
interest paid, not for an "economic" profit. Although the taxpayer
had the right to refmance the loan if funds became available from
other lenders at a lower rate, he either offered no evidence on the
prospect of such a reduction in interest rates or failed to convince the
trial judge that refmancing was a viable option, and the Supreme
Court implictly assumed that it was not. But a drastic, albeit un-
likely, decline in interest rates could have converted the investment
into a profitable venture, and another taxpayer, with faith in such a
change, might have believed that an economic profit could be made
from the very transaction that the Court characterized as a "sham."
In doing so, the Court incorporated the trial judge's fmdings of fact,
thereby implying a limited scope for the decision but other parts of
the opinion suggest that any taxpayer purchasing a similar contract
would be denied a deduction, regardless of his economic expecta-
tions, at least if he embarked on the investment when money market
conditions were similar to those prevailing during 1953 and 1954, the
years before the Court.
Another barrier to generalizing from the decided cases is uncer-
tainty whether the court, in some cases, is interpreting the particular
statutory provision on which the taxpayer relies, or is enunciating a
principle to be applied throughout the Internal Revenue Code. Thus,
in his famous opinion in the Gregory case, Judge Learned Hand said
of certain transactions:
38. Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 366: see Blum, Knetsch v. United States: A
Pronouncement on Tax Avoidance, 40 TAXES 296 (1962).
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[T]heir only defect was that they were not what [the statutory
predecessor of § 368(a)(1)] means by a "reorganization," because
the transactions were no part of the conduct of the business of
either or both companies; so viewed they were a sham ....39
Despite this reference to the meaning of a particular statutory provi-
sion, Judge Hand's language is regularly quoted as having much
broader significance.40 A related source of difficulty is the common
judicial practice ofciting the substance-over-form doctrine in combi-
nation with other broad concepts (e.g., the business purpose and step
transaction doctrines and the requirement of an accurate accounting
method), thus obscuring the independent force of each of these
grounds of decision.
Finally, for the reasons just canvassed, when a case holding that
the form chosen by a particular taxpayer does not accurately reflect
the substance of his transaction are compared with decisions in other
cases supporting the taxpayer's version of a similar transaction, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain whether a pair of decisions is
in conflict.41 Yet it would defy experience to conclude that if all
cases had been decided by the same judge or panel of judges, the
results would be the same. A summary of the substance-over-form
cases, therefore, runs the risk of portraying the area as more consis-
tent than any body of law can be.42
Turning now to the cases, the substance-over-form doctrine is
invoked by the government with greatest success when the trans-
action under examination entails self-dealing, since in these cir-
cumstances the form used often has minimal, if any, nontax
consequences and is therefore often chosen solely because it is ex-
pected to reduce taxes. For example, a purported credit sale of ptop-
39. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 8Il (2d Cir. 1934).
40. See also Blum's comment (supra note 38 at 305) that the Supreme Court in Knetsch
"was either saying a great deal about many and various tax-avoidance schemes not before the
Court, or it was omitting to indicate why the interest deduction should be interpreted as [lim-
ited to transactions that appreciably affect the taxpayer's beneficial interests)."
41. OccaSionally the Supreme Court grants certiorari because of a conflict among the
circuit courts involving cases of this type, but if each case rests on the "genuineness" of the
particular taxpayer's transaction, the nature of the "conflict" is unclear. In Knetsch, for exam-
ple, the conflict was with United States v. Bond, 258 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1958), where the trial
judge did not find the transaction to be a sham and the appellate court concluded that the
bond "is not the mere sham supposed," though it did not discuss the economic viability of the
transaction as a whole. See Blum, supra note 38, at 300-301.
42. See Rice, supra note 7, at 1024-1032.
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erty by parents to their children may, on analysis, be akin to a gift of
the property, because the alleged debt is more likely to be forgiven
(or paid off with funds received as gifts from the parents) than to be
enforced. Recognizing that "sales" within the family may not be
what they purport to be and that evidence of their true nature is
peculiarly within the control of the taxpayer, Congress has laid down
a number of statutory rules that treat intra-family sales differently
from sales to third parties. An example is IRC § 267(a)(I), forbid-
ding taxpayers to deduct losses on such sales, even if affected at the
property's fair market value.43
But even if a transaction is not explicitly condemned by the stat-
ute, its form may be disregarded by the courts in appropriate circum-
stances. For example, a sale and leaseback of real estate may be
denied sales status44 and the ostensible date of a sale may be ignored
in favor of the time when payment could have been made.45 Loans
to members of the lender's family also provide grist for the sub-
stance-over-form mill, since it is often a reasonable guess that the
borrower will not be pressed for repayment as vigorously as an out-
sider, and the same can be said of loans by shareholders to their own
corporation and, conversely, loans by their company to them, espe-
cially if the advances are proportionate to stock ownership.46
Self-dealing transactions between parent and subsidiary corpo-
rations and among other members of an affiliated corporate group
provide another set of tempting targets for legislative, administra-
tive, and judicial marksmen, armed with the substance-over-form
weapon. Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code permits the Inter-
nal Revenue Service to "distribute, apportion, or allocate gross in-
come, deductions credits, or allowances" among two or more
organizations that are "owned or controlled directly or indirectly by
the same interests. . . in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly
to reflect the income of any of such organizations." Pursuant to this
ample charter of authority, the Treasury has promulgated extensive
43. See also § 704(e)(3) (sale of partnership interest within family to be treated as a gift),
and § 166(d) (nonbusiness bad debt deductible only as capital loss, not as ordinary loss).
44. Century Electric Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1951), cerl. denied,342
U.S. 952 (1952); contra, Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1959).
45. Hineman v. Broderick, 99 F. Supp. 582, 583 (D. Kan. 1951) (receipt by farmer of
money for sale of grain delayed two years "to effect a possible saving of federal taxes").
46. See BITIKER & EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS (3d ed., 1971), ~ 4.02 and ~7.05.
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regulations that test all transactions among affiliated corporations by
the standard of "an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm's length
with another uncontrolled taxpayer."47 Transactions that would be
vulnerable to attack by the Internal Revenue Service with the sub-
stance-over-form doctrine are usually at least equally vulnerable
under IRe § 482,. and the two are often invoked in tandem by gov- .
ernment briefs.
Mention should also be made here of a diametrically opposite
approach to self-dealing, exemplified by the statutory permission
granted to affiliated corporations to file consolidated returns, under
which intra-group transactions are disregarded and the income or
loss of the group as a consolidated unit is based on its dealings with
the outside world.48 Though commendably realistic, this statutory
option is limited to the corporate members of an affiliated group (as
defmed), and has no analogue for individual members of a family,
no matter how closely related. Thus, when a married couple mes a
joint return, their fmancial transactions with each other (e.g., gain on
a sale of property) are, in general, reflected on the return rather than
disregarded.
Transactions at arm's length between the taxpayer and outsiders
are far less vulnerable to substance-over-form attacks by the govern-
ment than self-dealing transactions. For nontax reasons, the parties
usually fully express their understanding in the documents, so that
the chosen form ordinarily embodies the substance of their transac-
tion. This fusion of form and substance is fostered if, as often occurs,
they have divergent tax interests. Thus, when a business pays an em-
ployee for his services, the desire to deduct the payment as a business
expense will lead the employer to resist suggestions by the recipient
that the payment be disguised as a tax-free gift rather than reported
as taxable wages.49
This frequent opposition of interests does not mean that the
characterization adopted by the parties to an arm's-length bargain is
envariably conclusive. The employer, to continue with the example
just used, may be a tax-exempt organization or a persistently unsuc-
47. Treas. Regs. § 1.482-I(b).
48. IRC § 1501.
49. See IRC § 274{b) (deduction for business gifts limited to $25 per donee per year, if
amount is excludible from donee's income under IRC § J02).
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cessful enterprise with more deductions than it can use; if so, it may
be willing to cooperate with the employee, either as a costless gesture
of benevolence or in return for a concession by him. A more complex
bargain may be struck when two parties expect to be taxed at very
different rates, in which event they may choose a legal form that will
assign the tax advantages to the party who can best "use" them, and
then divide the tax savings thus achieved. Thus, the amount to be
paid under an alimony agreement is often affected by the fact that
the husband's right to deduct the payment will reduce his taxes more
than receiving the same amount will increase the wife's taxes; rail-
roads and airlines with a long history of business losses often lease
equipment rather than buy it, thereby enabling the lessor to derive a
tax advantage from depreciation deductions or investment credits
that would be useless to them; and most tax shelters similarly serve
to shift tax allowances to investors who can deduct them from top
bracket income.
If the transaction as consummated is clothed in a form that
fairly reflects its substance, however, it will ordinarily pass muster
despite the conscious pursuit of tax benefits; in this respect, it resem-
bles an individual taxpayer's isolated decision to pursue a tax-mini-
mizing route rather than a taxable one. On the other hand, if the
form of the transaction does not coincide with its substance, the fact
that it was negotiated at arm's-length by unrelated taxpayers will not
protect it against attack by the government, since the assumption of
opposing tax interests is inapplicable. The government can success-
fully invoke the substance-over-form doctrine, for example, in order
to treat a purported lease of business equipment with an option in
the "lessee" to purchase the property at the end of the term as a sale
on credit, if the option price is nominal in amount, the term of the
lease is coextensive with the anticipated useful life of the property, or
other substantive aspects of the arrangement are inconsistent with its
form. 50
The presence of a third party with whom the taxpayer has bar-
gained at arm's-length will also fail to protect a tax avoidance plan
if the formalities employed by the taxpayer have no significant im-
pact on the other contracting party and are tolerated or accepted by
him as an accommodation rather than viewed as an integral part of
50. See Rev. Rul. 54-540, 1955-2 (C.B. 39); Rev. Proc. 75-21, 1975-1 (C.B. 715).
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the basic transaction. This phenomenon is characteristic of cases in
which the taxpayer engages in preliminary mumbo-jumbo to prepare
assets for an impending sale or effects the transfer through a conduit
rather than directly. An acerbic comment by Chief Judge John R.
Brown of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit can stand as a
summary of this attitude. Refusing to allow the taxpayers in a com-
plex transaction to hide behind a facade entailing the use of an inter-
mediary named, by an appropriate fortuity, W.R. Deal, he said:
''The Deal deal was not the real deal. That ends it."51
Although the substance-over-form doctrine is ordinarily a one-
way street, taxpayers are sometimes permitted to repudiate the form
of a transaction which was accepted in ignorance, especially if the
taxpayer has the victim of another party's sharp practices or decep-
tion or other mitigating circumstances make it possible to character-
ize the form as a trap for the unwary. 52 The courts have not gone so
far as to require "informed consent" before holding a taxpayer to his
own red tape, however, and these cases of lenience, though impor-
tant, remain exceptional. More pervasive is the judicial willingness
to disregard book entries, which may evidence the taxpayer's con-
temporaneous opinion about a transaction but are not intended as a
representation of its tax consequences.
A rogue offshoot of the substance-over-form doctrine suggests
that when a taxpayer selects one of several forms that have identical
practical consequences in the real world, the government can disre-
gard the chosen form and tax the transaction as though the most
costly of the alternatives had been employed. The implications of
this theory are mind-boggling for even the most routine of business
transactions. Thus, a $10,000 salary paid to the sole shareholder of a
corporation could be analogized to (a) a contribution by him of his
labor without charge, coupled with (b) a distribution to him of a
$10,000 dividend. If the services are worth $10,000, the hypothetical
contribution-plus-dividend increases the value of the shareholder's
stock by $10,000, while the dividend decreases it by the same
amount. Judged by an arm's-length standard, the salary that was in
fact paid for the shareholder's services is a reasonable business ex-
51. Blueberry Land Co. v. Commissioner, 361 F.2d 93, 102 (5th Cir. 1966).
52. See generally Rosen, Substance Over For_A Taxpayer's Weapon, 1970 So. CALIF.
TAX INsT. 689; Donaldson, When Substance-Over-Form Argument is Available to the Taxpayer,
48 MARQ. L. REV. 41, 48-50 (1964).
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pense; yet nothing but its form-which may have been chosen solely
to reduce the corporation's federal income tax-distinguishes this
transaction from its hypothetical alternative.53
The same mode of analyzing transactions between related tax-
payers could be applied. to virtually all contracts, leases, and loans
between shareholders and their corporations or among affiliated cor-
porations; in each instance, the same practical and economic results
could ordinarily be achieved, though at greater tax cost, by combin-
ing a taxable dividend with a gratuitous transfer of the property or
services. Indeed, pushed to a drily logical extreme, the recasting of
transactions to accord with the most costly practical equivalent
would not have to await an actual transaction between the related
parties. Thus, a profitable corporation's accumulated earnings could
be treated as having been, in effect, (a) distributed to its shareholders·
(who, after all, have complete control over the corporation's divi-
dend policy) and (b) returned by them to the corporation as a contri-
bution to its capitaL For some purposes, it would be entirely
appropriate to describe the accumulation of earnings by the corpora-
tion as an abbreviated way of achieving the distribution and rein-
vestment of the funds, just as an economist, when computing
opportunity costs, treats an investor's decision to hold an asset as the
practical equivalent of selling it and immediately reinvesting the
proceeds in the same asset. Whether this brutally realistic mode of
analysis should be used to fix the tax consequences of a transaction is
another matter.
On close inspection, the most-costly-alternative theory turns out
to be a drastic extension, rather than a mere restatement, of the sub-
stance-over-form doctrine. Thus, although a salary paid by a one-
man corporation to its shareholder-employee is virtually identical in
practical results to a dividend coupled with unpaid services, it does
not follow that the salary is mere "form" and that the hypothetical
combination of unpaid services and a dividend is the "substance" of
the relationship. In actuality, both are formal ways by which the cor-
poration receives services and shareholder receives money. The legal
53. The hypothetical dividend might have to be repaid at the suit of a creditor if the
payment violated the applicable state dividend law, while the salary might not be vulnerable to
this attack; but this nontax distinction might be too trivial to be taken into account and would,
in any event, arise only if state law distinguished between the two transactions, despite their
practical equivalence.
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issue is whether the shareholder-employee received the money as
employee or as shareholder, and the substance-over-form doctrine
sheds no light on this problem of characterization. Since the practice
of paying salaries to shareholder-employees antedates the federal in-
come tax and is customary quite without regard to its tax conse-
quences, shareholder-employee salaries are routinely accepted at
face value, so far as the substance-over-form doctrine is concerned,
provided only that the salary does not exceed the fair value of the
services. While the most-costly-alternative theory would permit vir-
tually all such cases to be recast as a combination of unpaid services
and a dividend,54 the government has rarely even attempted to ex-
ploit this mode of increasing the tax bite. Perhaps this is because the
Code accepts at face value so many fictions (e.g., the separate iden-
tity of corporations, the independence of all members of the same
family, etc.), regularly imposing tax liabilities on this basis, that it
impliedly authorizes taxpayers to act on the same fictions. 55 As
Holmes said in rejecting a taxpayer's request that the courts pierce a
corporation's veil in a state tax case: "[I]t leads nowhere to call a
corporation a fiction. If it is a fiction it is a fiction created by law
with intent that it should be acted on as if true."56
Finally, it should be noted that terms like "sham," "camou-
flage," and "disguise" are not ordinarily used in substance-over-
form cases to impute fraudulent misconduct to the taxpayer, who
usually makes full disclosure of the formalities and is not a party to
any inconsistent secret understanding or commitments. On the other
hand, in appropriate situations, the full force of these pejorative
terms may be warranted, since formailities may be deliberately fash-
ioned and employed to cover up fraud.
54. See especially Judge L. Hand, dissenting, in Gilben v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399,
410-412 (2d Cir. 1957) (shareholders' right to deduct, as bad debts, their pro rata advances to
their corporation when it became insolvent), discussed by Chirelstein, supra note 16, at 460-
472.
55. Chirelstein (supra note 16, at 471) attributes to Judge L. Hand "a perception that the
Internal Revenue Code is in pan a clumsy system of implied elections, of which some, such as
the choice to do business in corporate form, are freely exercisable by the taxpayer and binding
on the Commissioner, while others, notably those involving self-dealing transactions, are
within the Commissioner's discretion to approve or reject." Viewed in the large, the Code's
"clumsy system of implied elections" is even more favorable to the taxpayer, because it is less
restricted by the most-costly-altemative theory than Judge Hand evidently wished.
56. Klein v. Board of Supervisors, 282 U.S. 19,24 (1930).
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D. Business Purpose
As applied to tax matters, the business purpose doctrine
originated with the Gregory case, involving the sole shareholder of a
corporation which owned certain marketable securities that she
wanted to obtain in her personal capacity for sale to a third party. A
straightforward distribution of the securities to her in anticipation of
the sale would have been taxable as a dividend. To avoid this result,
the securities were transferred by the corporate owner to a newly
created second corporation, whose stock was issued to the taxpayer;
and she then dissolved the new corporation, receiving the securities
as a liquidating distribution. Under the statutory predecessor ofIRC
§ 368(a)(1), taken literally, this transaction was a tax-free corporate
reorganization, and the trial court held that "[a] statute so meticu-
lously drafted must be interpreted as a literal expression of the tax-
ing policy" and that the second corporation was entitled to
recognition, despite its transitory life as a vehicle for achieving a
transfer of the securities from the first corporation to its sole share-
holder. 57 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed,
holding that the transaction did not qualify as a "reorganization"
when the purpose of the statutory definition of that term was taken
into account:
The purpose of the section is plain enough; men engaged in
enterprises-industrial, commercial, fmancial, or any other-
might wish to consolidate, or divide, to add to, or subtract from,
their holdings. Such transactions were not to be considered as "re-
alizing" any profit, because the collective interests still remained
in solution. But the underlying presupposition is plain that the re-
adjustment shall be undertaken for reasons germane to the con-
duct of the venture in hand, not as an ephemeral incident,
egregious to its prosecution. To dodge the shareholders' taxes is
not one of the transactions contemplated as corporate
"reorganization."58
The Supreme Court explicitly endorsed this reasoning, observing:
Putting aside . . . the question of motive in respect of taxation
altogether, and fixing the character of the proceeding by what ac-
tually occurred, what do we fmd? Simply an operation having no
_business or corporate purpose-a mere device which put on the
57. Gregory v. Commissioner, 27 BTA 223, 225 (1932).
58. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 811 (2d Cir. 1934).
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form of a corporate reorganization as a disguise for concealing its
real character, and the sole object and accomplishment of which
was the consummation of a preconceived plan, not to reorganize a
business or any part of a business, but to transfer a parcel of cor-
porate shares to the petitioner.59
Though its career was launched by a decision concerned only
with whether the steps employed by the taxpayer to achieve her ob-
jective were "what the statute means by a 'reorganization,' "60 the
business purpose standard rapidly proliferated as an implied re-
quirement of other statutory provisions. In 1949, Judge Learned
Hand summarized its jurisdiction as follows:
The doctrine of Gregory v. Helvering . . . means that in con-
struing words of a tax statute which describes commercial or in-
dustrial transactions we are to understand them to refer to
transactions entered upon for commercial or industrial purposes
and not to include transactions entered upon for no other motive
but to escape taxation.61
Judge Hand's reference to statutory provisions that describe
"commercial or industrial transactions" seemingly excludes applica-
tion of the business purpose doctrine to the so-called personal (or
"itemized") deductions, and indeed the concept of a "business" pur-
pose is ill-suited to tax allowances for payments that are not profit-
oriented, like alimony, medical expenses, and charitable contribu-
tions. Taxpayers routinely deduct these payments, even though they
serve personal rather than business purposes, and the Code obvi-
ously contemplates this practice.
More troublesome, however, is the status of interest paid on
loans incurred in tax avoidance transactions that promise no eco-
nomic gain, but will be worthwhile if the interest can be deducted.
Section 163 allows interest to be deducted even though the funds are
borrowed in a wholly personal context (e.g., a loan to fmance a sum-
mer vacation), but does it also sanction a deduction for interest paid
to fmance an uneconomic transaction serving only a tax avoidance
purpose? The leading case on this subject, Knetsch v. United States
59. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
60. For its ramifications in its original area of application, see BIITKER & EUSTIcE,
supra note 46, at ~ 14.51.
61. Commissioner v. Transport Trading & Terminal Corp., 176 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir.
1949).
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(discussed earlier),62 denied an interest deduction for loans of this
type on the ground that the transaction itself was a sham, without
explicitly employing the business purpose doctrine, but some deci-
sions on identical transactions relied primarily on Gregory in reach-
ing the same result, and these opinions were cited with apparent
approval by the Supreme Court in Knelsch.63 Another formulation is
that such a transaction lacks economic reality; in effect, it is all form
and no substance.
In another case ofthis type the court was unwilling to character-
ize the transaction as a sham, but it denied the deduction because the
loan did not have "purpose, substance, or utility apart from [its] an-
ticipated tax consequences."64 Recognizing that IRC § 163 is not
limited to interest paid on profit-oriented borrowings, the court nev-
ertheless held that some purpose other than tax avoidance was re-
quired by the statute. Conscious of the fact that taxpayers who can
afford to pay cash often buy automobiles and residences on credit,
partly because the interest will be deductible, however, the court lim-
ited its decision to "pure" tax avoidance transactions:
Section 163(a) should be construed to permit the deductibility of
interest when a taxpayer has borrowed funds and incurred an ob-
ligation to pay interest in order to engage in what within reason
can be termed purposive activity, even though he decided to bor-
row in order to gain an interest deduction rather than to finance
the activity in some other way. In other words, the interest deduc-
tion should be permitted whenever it can be said that the tax-
payer's desire to secure an interest deduction is only one of mixed
motives that prompts the taxpayer to borrow funds; or, put a third
way, the deduction is proper if there is some substance to the loan
arrangement beyond the taxpayer's desire to secure the deduc-
tion. . . . On the other hand, and notwithstanding Section
163(a)'s broad scope this provision should not be construed to per-
mit an interest deduction when it objectively appears that a tax-
payer has borrowed funds in order to engage in a transaction that
has no substance or purpose aside from the taApayer's desire to
62. Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361. See also Blum, supra note 38.
63. Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. at 366, n.4, citing Diggs v. Commissioner, 281
F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 908; Weller v. Commissioner, 270 F.2d 294 (3d
Cir. 1959), cerl. denied, 364 U.S. 908, affd, Emmons v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 26 (1958) and
Weller v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 36 (1958).
64. Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), cerl. denied, 385 U.S. 1005
(1967).
HeinOnline -- 21 Howard L.J. 717 1978
1978] PERVASIVE JUDICIAL DOCTRINES 717
obtain the tax benefit of an interest deduction; and ~ good exam-
ple of such purposeless activity is the borrowing of funds at 4% in
order to purchase property that returns less than 2% and holds out
no prospect of appreciation sufficient to counter the unfavorable
interest rate differentia1.65
By rephrasing the business purpose doctrine so that any "purposive
activity" (other than the mere reduction of taxes) will qualify under
statutory provisions that embrace nonbusiness transactions, the court
obviously sanctioned a tax deduction for the paradigmatic taxpayer
who borrows in compliance with the American way of life- "spend
now, pay later."
E. Step Transactions
The step transaction doctrine-requiring the interrelated steps
of an integrated transaction to be taken as a whole, rather than
treated separately-began as an interpretation of a detailed statutory
provision,66 as did the business purpose doctrine; but it has been an
equally successful cultural imperialist, gaining a foothold in almost
every area of the income tax law. It has been most extensively ap-
plied to corporate shareholder relations, however, and can be best
illustrated with examples from that area of the tax law.67
A business transaction, like the rest of life, often has no sharp
beginning or clearly defmed end; but since income must be com-
puted annually, it is often necessary to cut a transaction into its con-
stituent elements for tax purposes. If a segment is sliced too thin and
taken in isolation, however, it may be too artificial a base for tax
65. Id. at 741-742.
66. It is dangerous to be dogmatic in pinpointing the source of a protean doctrine, partic-
ularly since in its earlier days it was sometimes regarded as an aspect of the pervasive injunc-
tion to look at substance rather than form, but the earliest explicit statement of the step
transaction doctrine seems to be Warner Co. v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 125, 126 (1932)(A)
("the phrase 'in connection with a reorganization' [in § 204(a)(7) of the Revenue Act of
1926] permits, if it does not require, an examination of the several steps taken which
culminated in the taxpayer's acquisition of the. . . assets"). See also Carter Publications, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 28 B.T.A. 160, 164 (1933) ("the whole series of acts, corporate and other-
wise, conslituted only a single transaction. . ..") and Tulsa Tribune Co. v. Commissioner, 58
F.2d 937, 940 (10th Cir. 1932) (rejecting, a few months before Warner Co. was decided, an
"attempt [by the government] to break this transaction up into two elements by saying that
Jones bought the property and then transferred it to the corporation in exchange for its capital
stock").
67. See generally Paul, Step Transactions, supra note 19, at 200; Mintz and Plumb, Step
Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations, 12 NYU INST. ON FED. TAX. 247 (1954); Murray,
Step Transactions, 24 U. OF MIAMI L. REV. 60 (1969).
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computations. As a consequence, a series of formally separate steps
may be amalgamated and treated as a single transaction if they are
in substance integrated, interdependent, and focused on a particular
end result. Thus, the tax treatment of certain transfers of property to
a corporation in exchange for its stock depends on whether the trans-
ferors had control of the corporation "immediately after the ex-
change,"68 a phrase that seems to focus on an instantaneous point of
time, and thus to exclude where the requisite control is acquired in a
series of steps. But the Treasury Regulations, in conformity with the
case law, state that the statutory condition "does not necessarily re-
quire simultaneous exchanges . . . but comprehends a situation
where the rights of the parties have been previously dermed and the
execution of the agreement proceeds with an expedition consistent
with orderly procedure."69 Another consequence of taking all inte-
grated steps together in determining whether control exists "immedi-
ately after the exchange" is that momentary compliance with this
statutory condition is insufficient ifcontrol is then lost by reason of a
transfer of stock that, though somewhat delayed, was contemplated
from the outset as an essential part of the transaction.70
A similar example of the scope of the step transaction doctrine
is the "creeping control" concept applied in determining whether an
acquisition of stock of a target corporation by an acquiring corpora-
tion is "in exchange solely for. . . voting stock" within the meaning
of IRC § 368(a)(I)(B). If, for example, the acquiring corporation
bought part of the target corporation's stock for cash in 1976, and
then acquired an additional block in 1977 solely in exchange for its
voting stock, does the 1977 transaction meet the requirement of IRC
§ 368(b)(I)(B) that "the acquisition" be solely for stock? Taken by
itself, it appears to do so, but if the 1976 and 1977 acquisitions are
viewed as interrelated steps in a single transaction, the statutory
standard is violated because both cash and stock were used. Whether
there was only a single non-qualified acquisition for cash plus stock,
or one acquisition for cash and a later separable qualified acquisi-
tion for voting stock depends on all of the facts and circumstances. If
the 1976 purchase was consummated for its own sake, not as part of
68. IRe § 351(a).
69. Treas. Regs. § 1.351-I(a)(IO.
10. See BllTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 46,at ~ 3.10.
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an integrated plan that included the 1977 exchange, it can be disre-
garded as "old and cold," with the result that the 1977 acquisition
meets the test of IRC § 368(a)(I)(B).71
The same principle is illustrated by the "source of supply" cases,
in which a business enterprise acquires all of the stock of a supplier
and promptly liquidates it because the real target is the supplier's
inventory or equipment. If the two steps are clearly intended as an
integrated transaction, it will be treated as a purchase of the assets,
rather than as broken down into two separable steps (a purchase of
stock, followed by a liquidation of the acquired corporation). If the
stock was purchased as an investment, however, a later decision to
obtain the assets by liquidating the corporation would be treated as a
separable transaction.72
Although the foregoing illustrations all involve corporate-share-
holder relations, the step transaction doctrine is also encountered
with increasing frequency in other areas of tax law.73
While it is comparatively simple to foresee the results that flow
from the step transaction doctrine if it applies, it is more difficult to
predict whether it will be adopted as the proper method of analyzing
a set of facts. At one extreme, if the parties have agreed to take a
series of steps, no one of which will be legally effective unless all are
consummated, application of the step transaction is ordinarily as-
sured. In the absence of such an all-or-nothing plan, however, pre-
dictions are more perilous. Sometimes a series of steps, though
independent, may occur simultaneously or in rapid succession; the
taxpayer may simply seize upon the fact that he is engaged in negoti-
ations, or has a lawyer at hand, to achieve several independent
objectives, each of which would be pursued on its own even if the
others had to be abandoned. Recognizing this possibility, the Tax
Court has said: "The test [for applying the step transaction doctrine]
is, were the steps taken so interdependent that the legal relations cre-
71. Id. at ~ 14.13.
72. See Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1950),
ce,l. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951).
73. See, for example, Century Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1951)
(re IRC § 1031, relating to like kind exchanges); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson. 399
F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1968) (sale of old equipment and purchase of new, though purportedly
separate events, treated as a single transaction, subject to IRC § 1031); Coupe v. Commis-
sioner, 52 T.C. 394 (Acq. in result only, 1970-1 CD xv) (3-party exchange); Magnolia Develop-
mellt Corp. v. Commissioner, 'II 60,177 P-H Memo T.C. (1960) (transaction with charity).
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ated by one transaction would have been fruitless without a comple-
tion ofthe series."74 Despite intimations to the contrary in the early
cases, the step transaction doctrine does not require a prior agree-
ment committing the parties to the entire series of steps once the first
is taken; there is ample authority for linking several prearranged or
contemplated steps, even in the absence of a contractual obligation
to follow through.75 Moreover, while simultaneity is often the best
evidence of interdependence, the step transaction doctrine has been
applied to events separated by as much as 5 years and, on other facts,
held inapplicable to events occurring within a period of 30 min-
utes.76
The step transaction doctrine is usually enunciated as a general
principle of tax law, but the courts may be more ready to fuse several
steps into an integrated whole when applying one statutory provision
over another, implicitly assuming that Congress would have in-
tended this difference in approach. In applying a provision that in-
volves only a single taxpayer, for example, it would be fruitless to
ask whether several steps are linked together by contract; the statu-
tory focus may be wholly on the taxpayer's intent. Much can be said
for declining to link commercial transactions (e.g., the incorporation
of a proprietorship) with noncommercial events (e.g., gifts by the
taxpayer to members of his family), even if they occur simultane-
ously.77 But if the courts have been significantly influenced by con-
siderations of this type, they have not explicitly said SO.78
Although step transaction cases often, perhaps even usually, are
concerned with whether a particular step with significant legal or
business consequences should be treated as part of a larger single
74. Manhattan Bldg. Co. v. Commissioner, 27 T.e. 1032, 1042 (1957), citing American
Bantam Car Co. v. Commissioner, II T.e. 397 (1948), affdper curiam, 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir.
1949), cerl. denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950). The "interdependency test" was proposed and exten-
sively discussed by Paul, supra note 19. See also Mintz and Plumb, supra note 67, at 285,
concluding that in reorganization cases, the test "seems to be whether the step was intended, or
even contemplated as an alternative" rather than the interdependency test proposed by Paul.
75. See King Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 516, (Ct. CI. 1969).
76. Douglas v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 1122 (1938) (5 year delay in consummating a
corporate reorganization resulting from non-assignability of contracts and disputed claims);
Henricksen v. Braicks, 137 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1943) (liquidation treated as independent of
transfer of assets to new corporation 30 minutes later).
77. See BrITKER & EUSTICE, supra note 46, at ~ 3.10.
78. For a classification of "step transaction" cases by type of business transaction, see
Murray, supra note 67, and Mintz and Plumb, supra note 67.
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transaction, there are also many cases in which particular steps in an
integrated transaction are disregarded as transitory events or empty
formalities. These rather different results of the step transaction doc-
trine can be illustrated by two contrasting cases. First, assume that
the taxpayer transfers property to a corporation in exchange for its
stock, intending to sell half of the stock to a third party as soon as the
first step is completed. If the two steps are found to be interrelated
and mutually dependent, the taxpayer will not have control of the
transferee corporation "immediately after the exchange" within the
meaning of § 35l(a), with the result that any gain or loss realized on
transferring the property for the stock will be recognized for tax pur-
poses.79 The sale of the stock in this case is a serious, indeed a fate-
ful, step in the integrated transaction.
Suppose, by way of contrast, that an individual proprietor has
an opportunity to sell the entire merchandise inventory of his busi-
ness, but would like to report the impending profit as capital gain
rather than as ordinary income. Knowing that merchandise does not
qualify for capital gain treatment80 but that corporate stock usually
does, he transfers the merchandise to a newly created corporation in
exchange for its stock, which he promptly sells to the prospective
buyer, who in tum liquidates the corporation in order to get the as-
sets. On these facts, the sale of the stock would almost certainly be
regarded as a step in an integrated transaction by which the mer-
chandise was sold; but rather than being treated as a significant step
(as was the sale of stock in the prior example), it would be disre-
garded, and the transaction would be taxed as though this unneces-
sary step had not occurred. The classic formulation of this variation
of the step transaction doctrine is: "A given result at the end of a
straight path is not made a different result because reached by fol-
lowing a devious path."81
The unnecessary step in this case was a distribution of cash by a
bankrupt corporation to its shareholders, who were required to pay
the funds over to the company's creditors. In holding that this was
only a "devious path" by which corporate funds were routed to its
79. See supra note 73.
80. IRC § 1221(1).
81. Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 613 (1938).
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creditors {rather than a true distribution to the shareholders), the
Court said:
The preliminary distribution to the stockholders was a mean-
ingless and unnecessary incident in the transmission of the fund to
the creditors ... so transparently artificial that further discussion
would be a needless waste of time. The relation of the stockhold-
ers to the matter was that of a mere conduit.82
When the step transaction doctrine is thus employed to eliminate
transitory or unnecessary steps, it overlaps and becomes almost in-
distinguishable from the business purpose doctrine (under which the
unnecessary step is disregarded because lacking in business purpose)
and the substance-over-form principle (nullifying the unnecessary
step as a formality that merely obscures the substance of the transac-
tion).83 In a typical amalgamation of all three ideas, for example,
Rev. Rul. 70-140 provides:
The two steps of the transaction described above were part of
a prearranged integrated plan and may not be considered inde-
pendently of each other for Federal income tax purposes. The re-
ceipt by A of the additional stock of X in exchange for the sole
proprietorship assets is transitory and without substance for tax
purpose since it is apparent that the assets of the sole proprietor-
ship were transferred to X for the purpose of enabling Y to ac-
quire such assets without the recognition of gain to A.84
The principal practical difference between the "critical step"
and ''unnecessary step" variations of the step transaction doctrine
seems to lie in the taxpayer's greater ability to invoke the former
than the latter. The reason for linking together all interdependent
steps with legal or business significance, rather than taking them in
isolation, is to base tax liabilities on a realistic view of the entire
transaction. For this reason, and because the steps themselves are not
82. Id.
83. The Gregory case, 293 U.S., is the classic precedent for disregarding unnecessary
steps; it is usually cited as a source of the business purpose and substance-over-fonn principles,
but could equally well be viewed as a step transaction case, and it is cited in the Minnesota Tea
case, 302 U.S. in suppon of the "devious path" fonnula.
84. Rev. Rul. 70-140, 1970-1 C.B. 73. See also J.M. Turner & Co. v. Commissioner, 247
F.2d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 1957) ("it is the substance, not the fonn, of the transaction, which must
control our conclusion, and a transaction accomplished in two mutually dependent steps
should be viewed as a whole"); Perry v. United States, 520 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976) (business purpose for an isolated step in a multistep integrated
transaction insufficient; business purpose must be shown for a transaction as a whole).
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ordinarily intended to obscure the transaction's substance, the tax-
payer is ordinarily as free as the Commissioner to insist that it be
viewed as a whole.85 When unnecessary or transitory steps are delib-
erately employed by the taxpayer, however, the courts are less dis-
posed to permit the taxpayer to retrace his steps in order to leave his
devious path and get back on the straight and narrow; in these cir-
cumstances, the privilege of disregarding the unnecessary steps is
usually reserved for the Internal Revenue Service.86
F. Disavowal ofForm by Taxpayers
When taxpayers invoke the substance-over-form, business pur-
pose, or step transaction doctrines in order to escape the normal tax
consequences of a transaction to which they are parties, the judicial
reaction gravitates between two extremes.87
At one end of the spectrum, taxpayers have been told that the
government can cut through their red tap_e if it wishes, but that it is
equally free to leave them entangled in the form they selected. The
classic statement of this principle occurs in Higgins v. Smith, a 1940
opinion of the Supreme Court, holding that a taxpayer did not incur
a deductible loss on selling depreciated securities to a wholly-owned
corporation.88 Referring to Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement
Co. ,89 an earlier case taxing the gain on a similar sale despite the
taxpayer's argument that the transaction resulted in a paper profit
but not an economic gain, the court said:
In the Commonwealth Improvement Company case, the tax-
payer, for reasons satisfactory to itself voluntarily had chosen to
85. See Commissioner v. Ashland Oil & Reftning Co., 99 F.2d 568, 591 (6th Cir. 1938)
(taxpayer wanted to acquire assets of another corporation, but was compelled to acquire its
stock, which was promptly surrendered in complete liquidation; held, the transaction was in
effect an acquisition of the assets; "closely related steps will not be separated either at the
insistance of the taxpayer or the taxing authority"); Helvering v. New Haven & S.L.R., 121
F.2d 985, 988 (2d Cir. 1941) (rejecting "the effort of the Commissioner to atomize the plan, as
it were; i.e., to separate into its separate steps and treat the last as though it stood alone").
86. Infra note 90.
87. See generally supra note 52.
88. Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940). Subsequent to the taxable year before the
Court, Congress enacted the predecessor of IRC § 267(a)(I), which explicitly denies a deduc-
tion for such losses; but the Court held that this statutory provision did not imply that the law
was otherwise in prior years.
89. Burnet v. Commissioner Improvement Co., 287 U.S. 415 (1932). In this case, the
securities were sold by the corporation to its sole shareholder, but this factual difference was
not regarded as relevant in Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S.
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employ the corporation in its operations. A taxpayer is free to
. adopt such organization for his affairs as he may choose and hav-
ing elected to do some business as a corporation, he must accept
the tax disadvantages.
On the other hand, the Government may not be required to
acquiesce in the taxpayer's election of that form for doing business
which is most advantageous to him. The Government may look at
actualities and upon determination that the form employed for
doing business or carrying out the challenged tax event is unreal
or a sham may sustain or disregard the effect of the fiction as best
serves the purposes of the tax statute. To hold otherwise would
permit the schemes of taxpayers to supersede legislation in the de-
termination if the time and manner of taxation.90
This judicial refusal to permit taxpayers to repudiate their own
handiwork is occasionally supported by the traditional elements of
estoppel. The form as characterized by the taxpayer when the trans-
action is first reflected on the tax return may be accepted at face
value by the Internal Revenue Service; and if the taxpayer later at-
tempts to discard the form and portray events in a more realistic
light, it may be administratively difficult or even impossible to cor-
rect all related prior returns of the taxpayer and other parties to the
same transaction, because memories have faded or the statute of lim-
itations has run.91 But even when no irretrievable waves have been
set in motion, taxpayers have been sometimes denied the right to
invoke the substance-over-form doctrine:
It would be quite intolerable to pyramid the existing complexities
of tax law by a rule that the tax shall be that resulting from the
form of transaction taxpayers have chosen or from any other form
they might have chosen, whichever is less.92
90. Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. al 477-478. Another frequently quoted formulation of the
same point is by Judge Learned Hand, in United States v. Morris & Essex R. Co., 135 F.2d
711, 713 (2d Cir. 1943), cerJ. denied, 320 U.S. 754 (1943):
It is true that the Treasury may take a taxpayer at his word, so to say; when that
serves its purpose, it may treat his corporation as a different person from himself; but
that is a rule which works only in the Treasury's own favor; it cannot be used to
deplete the revenue.
See also Matthews v. United States, 36 AFTR 2d 5974 (D.S.C. 1975), anI! cases there cited.
9 I. For mitigation of the statute of limitations in the case of inconsistency by either the
taxpayer or the IRS, see IRC §§ 1311-1314.
92. Television Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1960). The
taxpayer was not necessarily asking for the benefit of the cheapest alternative to the form used;
the "substance" of a particular transaction may generate a lesser tax than would be owing if
the form is taken at face value, but the former amount may be greater than would have re-
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This attitude may be buttressed by a belief that a taxpayer's repudia-
tion of a form deliberately chosen by him is unappealing conduct
even when prejudice to the government's interests cannot be proved.
At the opposite extreme from the foregoing line of authority,
many cases hold that the substance-over-form doctrine is a two-way
street, open to the taxpayer as well as to the government. As early as
1929, for example, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit cited
the "settled principle" that "courts will not permit themselves to be
blinded or deceived by mere forms of law," and then observed:
The rule just stated is of peculiar importance in tax cases; for,
unless the courts are very careful to regard substance and form in
matters of taxation, there is grave danger on the one hand that the
provisions of the tax laws will be evaded through technicalities
and on the other that they will work unreasonable and unneces-
sary hardship on the taxpayer. It is instructive to note the many
tax cases decided in recent years in which the courts have not hesi-
tated to ignore corporate forms, and to decide the questions in-
volved in the light of what the parties have actually done, rather
than on the basis of the forms in which they have clothed their
transactions.93
In a more graphic expression of the same sentiment, the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit said: "One should not be garotted
by the tax collector for calling one's agreement by the wrong
name."94
In a similar vein, the Supreme Court has permitted taxpayers to
disavow a tax-oriented contract on showing that it conflicted with
economic reality, despite the government's willingness to accept the
contract as written.95 In reaching this result, the Court hinted, with-
suited from an alternative way of reaching a similar business result.
93. Western Maryland Ry. Co. v. Commissioner, 33 F.2d 695, 698 (4th Cir. 1929). Other
early cases to the same effect are Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242 (1924) (looking to substance of
transaction at taxpayer's behest); Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Motter, 66 F.2d 309 (10th Cir. 1933)
(same).
94. Pacific Rock & Gravel Co. v. United States, 297 F.2d 122 (9th Cir. 1961). Despite
this auspicious comment, the taxpayer lost; since the court attributed its action to a murky
agreement, perhaps it was a case of suicide rather than garotting. See also Clark v. United
States, 341 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1965), quoting the "garotte" metaphor but fInding that the trans-
action was correctly labelled.
95. Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126 (1947). The case involved an effort to shift lia-
bility for social security taxes on the wages of musicians from band leaders to ballroom opera-
tors, by vesting the latter with rights under a standard union contract that were not intended to
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out explicitly holding, that Higgins v. Smith and its other one-way
street cases should be confined to "the problem of corporate or asso-
ciation entity."96 There are many lower court decisions that similarly
allow the taxpayer to invoke the substance-over-form doctrine, and
some important IRS rulings appear to follow suit.97
Between these two extremes can be found cases allowing tax-
payers to escape from the forms selected by them, but imposing a
more stringent burden of proof than is ordinarily applicable in ordi-
nary tax cases. When the sales price of a going business is allocated
by the parties among its components (e.g., inventory, depreciable as-
sets, and a covenant not to compete), for example, some courts per-
mit an unilateral repudiation of the agreed allocation by the buyer or
seller only on "strong proof'; and in the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, the taxpayer can disavow theiallocation only on show-
ing that it was induced by mistake, fraud, or the like.98 This interme-
diate approach has been applied primarily to the efforts of taxpayers
to disavow allocations in contracts for the sale of a going business
(including the stock of incorporated enterprises) with a concomitant
covenant not to compete.99
be enforced. Despite this bare-faced denial of the employment realities, the IRS was willing to
accept the agreement, perhaps because the ballroom operators were more responsible taxpay-
ers than the band leaders. The scope of the decision, which allowed the operators to disavow
the contract, is not clear. Three dissenting justices adhered to the one-way street approach:
If the Government chooses to accept the contract on its face, the parties should be
barred from showing that it conceals the real arrangement. Tax administration
should not be so easily embarrassed.
96. Ed.
97. See, for example, Shaw v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 375 (1972) ("preference for sub-
stance over form in tax matters extends to claims of petitioner and respondent alike"); Winert's
Estate v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1961) (taxpayer "has a right to assert the prior-
ity of substance").
The basic IRS ruling requiring certain purported leases of equipment to be treated as sales
does not suggest that its principles are applicable only at the government's initiative, and its
neutral language implies that taxpayers can invoke its standards as freely as revenue agents.
See Rev. Rul. 55-540 and Rev. Proc. 75-21, supra note 50.
98. See, for example, Ullman v. Commissioner, 264 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1959) ("strong
proof'); Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1967) (evidence sufficient to vary
the terms of a written contract under common law, such as mistake, fraud, etc.).
99. This line of cases is discussed in detail in a forthcoming treatise on federal taxation
by the author, of which this article will form a part.
